The Anatomy of Public Corruption

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Walnut Creek City Council Bios (2019)

Connecting Success Factors to Bennett

The Dubious Phone Call and Time Wasting Project
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 Cindy Silva is currently serving as the Mayor of Walnut Creek.  She was first elected to the City Council in 2006 and was subsequently re-elected to the Council in 2010, re-appointed in 2014, and re-elected in 2018. She served as mayor in 2010-11, 
Cindy Silva_web 2019and again in 2012-13. Prior to her election to the City Council, Silva served on the Planning Commission from 2004-06, including two years during which the City was updating and adopting General Plan 2025.
As mayor in 2011, Silva founded Walnut Creek Community Service Day, which she still co-chairs. Now in its eighth year, Community Service Day has involved an average 1,200 volunteers each year, contributing more than 35,000 cumulative hours to complete projects for schools, libraries, open spaces, parks, the arts, and community service organizations. The Community Service Day effort was honored to receive a 2012 Helen Putnam Award for excellence from the League of California Cities.  Also in 2011, Silva spearheaded a Community Blue Ribbon Task Force on Fiscal Health, a 14-member community-based group that invested 9 months and more than 3,000 person hours in assessing and providing recommendations on Walnut Creek's long-term operating revenues and expenses, capital assets and investments, and financial policies. In 2013 as mayor, Silva initiated 2nd Saturday Spotlight, a year-long program that gave community members an opportunity to learn more about some of Walnut Creek's local treasures and city operations.
In her role as a council member, Silva has served on numerous Council committees:  Finance, Public Education, Housing and Community Development, Community Development Block Grant and Community Service Grants Committee, and Youth and Family Services. She has served on ad hoc committees for economic development, for the planned improvements to Broadway Plaza, and for the Walnut Creek Transit Village. She has served as the Council liaison to Walnut Creek Downtown, the Walnut Creek Chamber of Commerce Tourism Business Improvement District, Rossmoor and the Diablo Regional Arts Association.
Regionally, Silva is one of two members of the City Council representing Walnut Creek on the Central Contra Costa Solid Waste Authority (Recycle Smart), a joint partnership with other central county jurisdictions that manages garbage and recycling services. She was chair of the Authority in 2014. Silva also is a director of the East Bay Regional Communications System Authority, a 43-agency authority that has built and operates a state-of-the-art, interoperable public safety radio system serving the 2.5 million people of Alameda and Contra Costa counties. For EBRCSA, Silva serves on the Finance Committee. Silva is also immediate past chair (2017) of the Contra Costa Mayors' Conference and serves on its Executive Committee.
In 2017, Silva was appointed by the Governor as a local government representative on the California Seismic Safety Commission. Silva is actively involved both regionally and at the state level in the League of California Cities. Since 2015, she has been a member of the League’s statewide Board of Directors; she also sits on the League’s Housing, Community and Economic Development Policy Committee (2010-2018) and chaired the committee in 2016. In 2012-13, Silva was one of 16 city representatives on the League’s Strategic Initiatives Task Force. In September 2010 and again in 2011, she appeared as a panel member during the League’s annual conference, speaking on how cities were surviving the fiscal crisis. Locally, Silva was 2013 president League’s East Bay Division, which comprises the 33 cities of Contra Costa and Alameda counties. From 2008-2010, Silva was Walnut Creek’s representative to TRANSPAC, the regional transportation planning committee of Central Contra Costa; she served as chair of TRANSPAC in 2010. Through this group, Silva led efforts to find regional solutions to local transportation and  traffic safety issues, including school crossing guard programs, major roadway improvements, and bike-pedestrian enhancements.
A resident of Walnut Creek since 1984, Silva has been an active community volunteer for more than 20 years. She is a director of the Walnut Creek Civic Pride Foundation, which raised more than $380,000 for the new all abilities playground at Heather Farm Park; she is a treasurer of Walnut Creek Sister Cities International; and she is vice chair of the Board for Hospice of the East Bay. Previously, Silva served on the committee for the East Bay Women’s Conference (2008-2016), on the committee for the One City One Book program (2006-2015), and on the Action for Beauty Council. In 2013-14, Silva was a member of the Centennial Steering Committee; as part of this, she co-chaired Centennial Heritage Day at Borges Ranch, she co-chaired the involvement of the former mayors in the Centennial, and she was integral in the development of the Centennial marketing program, including the Centennial website.
Previously, Silva volunteered for our local libraries, schools, and youth and youth sports programs.
·        For our libraries, Silva was a member of the capital campaign committee for the Walnut Creek Library, which raised more than $5 million for the new facility. In 2010 and 2012, she co-chaired Authors under the Stars, the annual gala for Walnut Creek’s libraries. Silva co-chaired the Yes -- A New Walnut Creek Library Committee, working for passage of Measure R (Fall 2005) and Proposition 81 (June 2006). She has served as a member of the City’s Library Advisory Team and worked with the Walnut Creek Library Foundation. She was a member of the campaign committee for Measure Q, which brought extended library hours to Walnut Creek (2002).
·        As a volunteer for schools, Silva is a past PTSA president for Las Lomas High School (2003-2005) and past member of the Board of both the Las Lomas and Walnut Creek Intermediate parent organizations. For Las Lomas, she also served on the WASC Accreditation Committee and on the Student Carpool Parking Committee. She was a liaison member of the Las Lomas Foundation Board of Directors. She received the California State PTA Continuing Service Award in 2005. From 2005-2010, Silva served on the Measure A Oversight Committee for the Acalanes High School District. She previously served on the district’s Revenue Committee. She is a former director of the Walnut Creek Education Foundation. In 2001, she co-chaired Measure C for the Walnut Creek School District, a parcel tax that funded lower class size for grades 4-8; she subsequently served on the committees for funding measures for the Walnut Creek School District and Acalanes High School District in 2002 and 2005.
·        For local youth, Silva served as a director and scholarship chair of the Walnut Creek Fountain for Youth Foundation. She served on the Board of Directors of the Walnut Creek Soccer Club for six years (1999-2004), managing fields, game scheduling, referees and registration. She is a past president and four-year member of the Board of the Walnut Creek Swim Conference (2001-2004). She is a past mother advisor of the Concord chapter of California Rainbow Girls, a Masonic youth organization. In 2004, she served on the Sister City committee for the visit of the youth soccer team from Siofok, Hungary.
Silva has 40 years of business experience in marketing and communications in industries as diverse as telecommunications, biotech, and the non-profit sector. Since 1980, she has owned her own consulting business -- originally Eisley Communications, Inc., now Eisley Silva Communications.
A summa cum laude graduate of the University of Southern California, Silva has a bachelor’s degree in journalism. She is a native of Santa Cruz, California. She and her husband, Tom, have a daughter, Katie, who is a 2005 graduate of Las Lomas High School and 2009 graduate of the University of Washington in Seattle. 
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Obit: The Clare Orton Murder and Orton Development

Cnetscandal.blogspot.com


WALNUT CREEK — Two promising students — one a freshman at San Diego State and the other who studied engineering at Stanford University — died Tuesday in what police said looked like a murder-suicide in a home just north of Ygnacio Valley Road.
Clare Orton, a 19-year-old majoring in environmental engineering in San Diego, was found dead in her parents’ Walnut Creek home off Homestead Avenue. Also there was the body of Scott Bertics, a 21-year-old Lafayette resident who had attended Stanford.
Police called to the neighborhood around 6:50 a.m. said they found the two dead from gunshot wounds inside a home on Holton Court.
The two knew each other and had dated, police said.
She had graduated from Las Lomas High School in 2014 and he from Acalanes in Lafayette in 2012. Both were interested in engineering and both were long distance runners on the track teams at their high schools.
Orton’s family lived in the home for more than 10 years, said neighbor Linda Darnsteadt.
The “very pleasant” college student was visiting her home for the summer break from San Diego State, where she had completed her first year, Darnsteadt said.
“I’m just so sad. That’s so tragic,” she said.
Darnsteadt and her husband Gary said that they did not hear gunshots.
“We knew something tragic had happened, but we didn’t know what,” Linda Darnsteadt said. Police cars filled the cul-de-sac until noonOrton was an honors student at San Diego State, according to a school merit page. Her Facebook page includes a reference to membership in the Society of Women Engineers at San Diego State and to the Eco-Action Club at Las Lomas High School in Walnut Creek.
For a photo of a rainbow posted on her Facebook page, she wrote, “When the sunrise is underwhelming, turn around, you may see a double rainbow.”
Bertics was on leave of absence from Stanford and last attended the school in the fall of 2014, a school spokesman said.
Stanford’s website lists Bertics as a member of a team that in 2013 worked on project called “Controlling Robot Dynamics with Spiking Neurons.” He is also credited in a 2014 paper by some of the same team members for developing the driver interface in a project titled: “Controlling Articulated Robots in Task-Space with Spiking Silicon Neurons.”
A 2011 Github entry shows his pleasure at winning an animation code award. “I wrote this program during the summer quarter in 2011 and it won the Stanford CS106A graphics contest!”
Bertics also had a YouTube channel called “sbertics” on which he put videos of his projects, but the newest videos were of glider flights over Oahu in Hawaii. His electronic device videos were three years old.
Walnut Creek police would like to hear from anyone who might have information about what happened. They can be reached at 925-943-5844.


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Christiansen, Chetcuti, Lapus and Butler - The real estate links that lead to the Seeno's

Lafayette CA:  For several decades of perhaps longer, a series of major fires, incidents and accidents have occurred in Contra Costa County and the greater Bay Area.  For this resident some incidents have been nearer than expected.

Contra Costa Narcotics Enforcement Taskforce (CNET or CCCNET) 
The CNET Scandal or Dirty DUI Case involving spouse being setup by Private Investigator Chris Butler stands out as the worst example of well entrenched and hidden corruption ever but where was the Council of Chief's?

17 Koala CourtWalnut Creek (Unincorporated), CA 94596

Owner:
Lapus Bing
City:
Walnut Creek (Unincorporated)
Zip:
94596
County:
Contra Costa County CA
Region:
East Bay
Neighborhood:
South Walnut Creek
Subdivision:
Somerset
Street:
Koala Court
775 is an Excellent credit score, what's yours?
Yr. Built:
1955
Builder:
Sqft (land | living):
11,200 land | 2,057 living
Bedrooms:
6
Bathrooms:
3
Property Taxes:
$8,228.52 (2015)
Stories:

Sales History

PriceTypeDateB-Buyer/S-SellerAgent
N/AResale04/09/1997B: Roozee & Christiansen IncBA: N/A
  S: Benny Chetcuti JrSA: N/A

Info & Demographics

InformationDemographics
Elementary School:N/A
Middle School:N/A
High School:Acalanes Union High School
U.S. Representative:U.S. Rep. John Garamendi (D-10)
Median Income$93,497
White: All*93.2%
White: Latin or Hispanic*2.3%
Black or African American*1.3%
American Indian and Alaska Native*0.5%
Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander*0.2%
Asian*6.5%
Census Tract:3430.03/Rudgear Park
*Alone or in combinationSource: U.S. Census
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OBIT: Gary Vinson Collins 11/27/68 - 12/19/11

More Obituaries

Gary Vinson Collins


During September 2004 Pete Bennett was attacked by Gary Vinson Collins who was Danville Building Inspector.

By 2011, he was dead a few weeks after falling to his death at Palo Alto High School, Palo Alto CA

Bennett Litigation

Gary Vinson Collins

Gary Vinson Collins 11/27/68 - 12/19/11 Resident of San Ramon Gary age 43 passed away in Stanford Medical Center as a result of complications resulting from injuries he sustained in a workplace accident. Gary born to Don & Mary Ann Collins grew up in Pleasant Hill and attended Acalanes High School. He spent many years helping his father Don Collins build their family businesses Lafayette Big O Tires and Oakdale Big O Tires. He later moved on to a successful career as a city building inspector. He was well known for his enthusiasm for life with his family and generosity as a loving caring friend. He is survived by his wife and soul-mate Renee Collins and his loving sons Justin 16 and Garrett 10, and his father Don Collins of Pleasant Hill. A Celebration of his life will be held at 4:00 pm January 4th at The Church on The Hill 20801 San Ramon Valley Blvd. San Ramon. A reception will be held for the family immediately following. In lieu of flowers, donations to the children's education fund can be made to CollegeAmerica, account number 73332486. Please mail contributions to American Funds P.O. Box 6164 Indianapolis, IN 46206-5154. - See more at: http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/contracostatimes/obituary.aspx?pid=155268786#sthash.cKUCe4NC.dpuf

2404. HOBBS ACT -- UNDER COLOR OF OFFICIAL RIGHT

In addition to the "wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear," the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951) defines extortion in terms of "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent . . . under color of official right." In fact, the under color of official right aspect of the Hobbs Act derives from the common law meaning of extortion. As the Supreme Court explained in a recent opinion regarding the Hobbs Act,

"[a]t common law, extortion was an offense committed by a public official who took 'by color of his office' money that was not due to him for the performance of his official duties. . . . Extortion by the public official was the rough equivalent of what we would now describe as 'taking a bribe.'" Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
In order to show a violation of the Hobbs Act under this provision, the Supreme Court recently held that "the Government need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts." While the definition of extortion under the Hobbs Act with regard to force, violence or fear requires the obtaining of property from another with his consent induced by these means, the under color of official right provision does not require that the public official take steps to induce the extortionate payment: It can be said that "the coercive element is provided by the public office itself." Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992); see United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 130 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) ("[t]he public officer's misuse of his office supplies the necessary element of coercion . . . .").

This theory of extortion under color of official right has resulted in the successful prosecution of a wide range of officials, including those serving on the federal, state and local levels. For example: United States v. O'Connor, 910 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 953 (1991) (police officer accepts payments from FBI agents posing as crooked auto parts dealers); United States v. Stephenson, 895 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1990) (international trade official in Department of Commerce accepts payments to influence ruling); United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1986) (state highway administrator accepts money from road building contractor); United States v. Wright, 797 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987) (city prosecutors accept money for not prosecuting drunk drivers); United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1986) (city commissioner accepts money for awarding city concession); United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986) (judges accept payments to fix cases); United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975) (state senator accepts money from landlord seeking government office lease). In United States v. Stephenson, 895 F.2d at 871-73, the defendant, who was a federal official, unsuccessfully contended that the Hobbs Act only applied to state and local officials and that prosecution of federal official for extortion would have to be exclusively brought under 18 U.S.C. §872: extortion by officers and employees of the United States. The court found that the government could seek a charge under whichever of these two overlapping statutes it thought appropriate. Moreover, "it is not a defense to a charge of extortion under color of official right that the defendant could also have been convicted of bribery." Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).

GENERAL RULE: The usual fact situation for a Hobbs Act charge under color of official right is a public official trading his/her official actions in a area in which he/she has actual authority in exchange for the payment of money.

Some cases under certain fact situations, however, have extended the statute further. For example:

Some courts have held that a Hobbs Act violation does not require that the public official have de jure power to perform any official act paid for as long as it was reasonable to believe that he/she had the de facto power to perform the requested act. See United States v. Nedza, 880 F.2d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 1989) (victim reasonably believed state senator had the ability to impact a local business); United States v. Bibby, 752 F.2d 1116, 1127-28 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Sorrow, 732 F.2d 176, 180 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Rindone, 631 F.2d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 1980) (public official can extort money for permit beyond control of his office, so long as victim has a reasonable belief that he could affect issuance); United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 643 (3rd Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975); United States v. Price, 507 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974).
Most courts have held that a Hobbs Act violation does not require that the public official be the recipient of the benefit of the extortion, and that a Hobbs Act case exists where the corpus of the corrupt payment went to a third party. However, consistent with the federal offenses of bribery and gratuities under 18 U.S.C. § 201 (see 9 U.S.A.M. §§ 85.101 through 85.105), where the corpus of the corrupt payment inures to the benefit of a person or entity other than the public official most courts have also required proof of a quid pro quo understanding between the private corrupter and the public official. See United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1577 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984) ("a Hobbs Act prosecution is not defeated simply because the extorter transmitted the extorted money to a third party."); United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) (insurance agency made kickbacks to brokers selected by political leader of town); United States v. Scacchetti, 668 F.2d 643 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1132 (1982); United States v. Forszt, 655 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980); United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); United States v. Brennan, 629 F.Supp. 283 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 798 F.2d 581 (2d Cir. 1986). But see McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991)(allegedly corrupt payment made in the form of a campaign contribution to a third party campaign organization was insufficient to support a Hobbs Act conviction absent evidence of a quid pro quo).
Some courts have held that the Hobbs Act can be applied to past or future public officials, as well as to ones who presently occupy a public office at the time the corrupt payment occurs. See United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033, 1035-38 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976) (court answered affirmatively the question "whether, within the meaning of the Hobbs Act, it is a crime for candidates for political office to conspire to affect commerce by extortion induced under color of official right during a time frame beginning before the election but not ending until after the candidates have obtained public office."); United States v. Lena, 497 F.Supp. 1352, 1359 (W.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd mem., 649 F.2d 861 (3rd Cir. (1981); United States v. Barna, 442 F.Supp. 1232, 1235 (M.D.Pa. 1978), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1376 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978).
Some courts have held that private persons who are not themselves public officials can be convicted under this provision if they caused public officials to perform official acts in return for payments to the non-public official. United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) (court upheld conviction of head of local Republican Party under color of official right where defendant could be said to have caused, under 18 U.S.C. §2(b), public officials to induce a third party to pay out money); see United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1572-73 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984) (private attorney's conviction of Hobbs Act violation upheld due to complicity with state senator); United States v. Marcy, 777 F.Supp. 1398, 1399-400 (N.D.Ill. 1991); United States v. Barna, 442 F.Supp. 1232 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1376 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978). But see United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 829-32 (7th Cir. 1991) ("we believe that, as a general matter and with caveats as suggested here, proceeding against private citizens on an 'official rights' theory is inappropriate under the literal and historical meanings of the Hobbs Act, irrespective of the actual 'control' that citizen purports to maintain over governmental activity.").
Some courts have also held that private individuals who make payments to a public official can be charged under the Hobbs Act, either as an aider and abettor or co-conspirator, if he or she is truly the instigator of the transaction. See United States v. Torcasio, 959 F.2d 503, 505-06 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1276-79 (4th Cir. 1986) (conviction affirmed for aiding and abetting extortion under color of official right even though defendant, who paid kickbacks from corporate coffers, was an officer of the victim corporation ); United States v. Wright, 797 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1986). But see United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 823-24 (2d Cir 1990) (consultant employed to help restaurants obtain approvals from corrupt health inspectors had no stake in the conspiracy and was not promoting the outcome).
Finally, in a federal prosecution of a state legislator, there is no legislative privilege barring the introduction at trial of evidence of the defendant's legislative acts. The Supreme Court has held that in such a prosecution a speech or debate type privilege for state legislators cannot be made applicable through Fed.R.Evid. 501. The Court said such privilege is not required by separation of powers considerations or by principles of comity, the two rationales underlying the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution, art. I, §6, cl. 1. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368-74 (1980).
CAVEAT: The Hobbs Act and Campaign Contributions. The Supreme Court has held that, when an allegedly corrupt payment masquerades as a campaign contribution, and when there is no evidence that the corpus of the "contribution" inured to the personal benefit of the public officer in question or was a product of force or duress, the Hobbs Act requires proof of a quid pro quo agreement between the contributor and the public officer. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991). However, the Court has also held that proof that a quid pro quo agreement existed in a corruption case brought under the Hobbs Act may be proven circumstantially. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992). This interpretation of the dimensions of the hobbs Act in corruption scenarios is consistent with the parameters of the facts needed to prove the federal crimes of bribery and gratuities under 18 U.S.C. § 201. See United States v. Brewster, 50-6 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1972), 9 U.S.A.M. §§ 85.101 through 85.105, supra.

CAVEAT: The Hobbs Act and evidence of a quid pro quo. When the Hobbs Act is applied to public corruption scenarios that lack evidence of actual "extortionate" duress, some courts have interpreted the Hobbs Act very strictly to require proof of a quid pro quo relationship between the private and the public parties to the transaction, even where the corpus of the payment inured to the personal benefit of the public official. See United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d. 543 (11th Cir. 1994)(Hobbs Act did not apply to pattern of in-kind payments given personally to Florida mayor in the absence of evidence of a quid pro quo relationship between the mayor and alleged private corrupter); United States v. Taylor, 993 F.2d 382 (4th Cir. 1993)(same); United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 1086 (9th Cir. 1991)(same); contra United States v. Brandford, 33 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 1994)(Hobbs Act does not require proof of quid pro quo where corpus of corrupt payment inured to the personal benefit of public officer). In addition, some courts require that corruption cases brought under the "color of official right" clause of the Hobbs Act be accompanied by proof that the public official induced the payment. See Montoya, supra.

At the very least, the courts will probably not extend the "color of official right" clause of the Hobbs Act beyond the parameters of crimes of bribery and gratuities in relation to federal officials that are described in 18 U.S.C. § 201. See United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974), 9 U.S.A.M. §§ 85.101 through 85.105, supra. This means that where the corpus of the alleged corrupt payment passed to someone or something other than the public official personally (including those where it passed to a political committee), the Hobbs Act probably does not apply unless there is also evidence of a quid pro quo. And even then, some Circuits, such as the Ninth, require additional proof that the payment was induced by the public official.

PRACTICE TIP: The Public Integrity Section possesses considerable expertise in using the Hobbs Act to prosecute public corruption. While not required, AUSAs are strongly urged to consult with the Public Integrity Section in the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases under this statutory theory. Public Integrity can be reached at 202-514-1412, or by fax at 202-514-3003.

[cited in JM 9-131.010]

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Town of Danville Attempted Murder of Bennett

More Obituaries

Gary Vinson Collins


During September 2004 Pete Bennett was attacked by Gary Vinson Collins who was Danville Building Inspector.

By 2011, he was dead a few weeks after falling to his death at Palo Alto High School, Palo Alto CA



Bennett Litigation


Gary Vinson Collins

Gary Vinson Collins 11/27/68 - 12/19/11 Resident of San Ramon Gary age 43 passed away in Stanford Medical Center as a result of complications resulting from injuries he sustained in a workplace accident. Gary born to Don & Mary Ann Collins grew up in Pleasant Hill and attended Acalanes High School. He spent many years helping his father Don Collins build their family businesses Lafayette Big O Tires and Oakdale Big O Tires. He later moved on to a successful career as a city building inspector. He was well known for his enthusiasm for life with his family and generosity as a loving caring friend. He is survived by his wife and soul-mate Renee Collins and his loving sons Justin 16 and Garrett 10, and his father Don Collins of Pleasant Hill. A Celebration of his life will be held at 4:00 pm January 4th at The Church on The Hill 20801 San Ramon Valley Blvd. San Ramon. A reception will be held for the family immediately following. In lieu of flowers, donations to the children's education fund can be made to CollegeAmerica, account number 73332486. Please mail contributions to American Funds P.O. Box 6164 Indianapolis, IN 46206-5154. - See more at: http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/contracostatimes/obituary.aspx?pid=155268786#sthash.cKUCe4NC.dpuf













A Case for Racketeering?



The Murder of Collins

City Hall December 2, 2011

During a meeting in Walnut Creek City Hall with Chief Bryden, City Manager Ken Nordoff and Pete Bennett, legal documents were passed to Nordoff and Bryden.


By December Gary Vinson Collins was dead





Bennett v. Collins

2404. HOBBS ACT -- UNDER COLOR OF OFFICIAL RIGHT
In addition to the "wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear," the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951) defines extortion in terms of "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent . . . under color of official right." In fact, the under color of official right aspect of the Hobbs Act derives from the common law meaning of extortion. As the Supreme Court explained in a recent opinion regarding the Hobbs Act,

"[a]t common law, extortion was an offense committed by a public official who took 'by color of his office' money that was not due to him for the performance of his official duties. . . . Extortion by the public official was the rough equivalent of what we would now describe as 'taking a bribe.'" Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
In order to show a violation of the Hobbs Act under this provision, the Supreme Court recently held that "the Government need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts." While the definition of extortion under the Hobbs Act with regard to force, violence or fear requires the obtaining of property from another with his consent induced by these means, the under color of official right provision does not require that the public official take steps to induce the extortionate payment: It can be said that "the coercive element is provided by the public office itself." Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992); see United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 130 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) ("[t]he public officer's misuse of his office supplies the necessary element of coercion . . . .").

This theory of extortion under color of official right has resulted in the successful prosecution of a wide range of officials, including those serving on the federal, state and local levels. For example: United States v. O'Connor, 910 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 953 (1991) (police officer accepts payments from FBI agents posing as crooked auto parts dealers); United States v. Stephenson, 895 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1990) (international trade official in Department of Commerce accepts payments to influence ruling); United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1986) (state highway administrator accepts money from road building contractor); United States v. Wright, 797 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987) (city prosecutors accept money for not prosecuting drunk drivers); United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1986) (city commissioner accepts money for awarding city concession); United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986) (judges accept payments to fix cases); United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975) (state senator accepts money from landlord seeking government office lease). In United States v. Stephenson, 895 F.2d at 871-73, the defendant, who was a federal official, unsuccessfully contended that the Hobbs Act only applied to state and local officials and that prosecution of federal official for extortion would have to be exclusively brought under 18 U.S.C. §872: extortion by officers and employees of the United States. The court found that the government could seek a charge under whichever of these two overlapping statutes it thought appropriate. Moreover, "it is not a defense to a charge of extortion under color of official right that the defendant could also have been convicted of bribery." Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).

GENERAL RULE: The usual fact situation for a Hobbs Act charge under color of official right is a public official trading his/her official actions in a area in which he/she has actual authority in exchange for the payment of money.

Some cases under certain fact situations, however, have extended the statute further. For example:

Some courts have held that a Hobbs Act violation does not require that the public official have de jure power to perform any official act paid for as long as it was reasonable to believe that he/she had the de facto power to perform the requested act. See United States v. Nedza, 880 F.2d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 1989) (victim reasonably believed state senator had the ability to impact a local business); United States v. Bibby, 752 F.2d 1116, 1127-28 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Sorrow, 732 F.2d 176, 180 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Rindone, 631 F.2d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 1980) (public official can extort money for permit beyond control of his office, so long as victim has a reasonable belief that he could affect issuance); United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 643 (3rd Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975); United States v. Price, 507 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974).
Most courts have held that a Hobbs Act violation does not require that the public official be the recipient of the benefit of the extortion, and that a Hobbs Act case exists where the corpus of the corrupt payment went to a third party. However, consistent with the federal offenses of bribery and gratuities under 18 U.S.C. § 201 (see 9 U.S.A.M. §§ 85.101 through 85.105), where the corpus of the corrupt payment inures to the benefit of a person or entity other than the public official most courts have also required proof of a quid pro quo understanding between the private corrupter and the public official. See United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1577 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984) ("a Hobbs Act prosecution is not defeated simply because the extorter transmitted the extorted money to a third party."); United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) (insurance agency made kickbacks to brokers selected by political leader of town); United States v. Scacchetti, 668 F.2d 643 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1132 (1982); United States v. Forszt, 655 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980); United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); United States v. Brennan, 629 F.Supp. 283 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 798 F.2d 581 (2d Cir. 1986). But see McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991)(allegedly corrupt payment made in the form of a campaign contribution to a third party campaign organization was insufficient to support a Hobbs Act conviction absent evidence of a quid pro quo).
Some courts have held that the Hobbs Act can be applied to past or future public officials, as well as to ones who presently occupy a public office at the time the corrupt payment occurs. See United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033, 1035-38 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976) (court answered affirmatively the question "whether, within the meaning of the Hobbs Act, it is a crime for candidates for political office to conspire to affect commerce by extortion induced under color of official right during a time frame beginning before the election but not ending until after the candidates have obtained public office."); United States v. Lena, 497 F.Supp. 1352, 1359 (W.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd mem., 649 F.2d 861 (3rd Cir. (1981); United States v. Barna, 442 F.Supp. 1232, 1235 (M.D.Pa. 1978), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1376 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978).
Some courts have held that private persons who are not themselves public officials can be convicted under this provision if they caused public officials to perform official acts in return for payments to the non-public official. United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) (court upheld conviction of head of local Republican Party under color of official right where defendant could be said to have caused, under 18 U.S.C. §2(b), public officials to induce a third party to pay out money); see United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1572-73 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984) (private attorney's conviction of Hobbs Act violation upheld due to complicity with state senator); United States v. Marcy, 777 F.Supp. 1398, 1399-400 (N.D.Ill. 1991); United States v. Barna, 442 F.Supp. 1232 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1376 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978). But see United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 829-32 (7th Cir. 1991) ("we believe that, as a general matter and with caveats as suggested here, proceeding against private citizens on an 'official rights' theory is inappropriate under the literal and historical meanings of the Hobbs Act, irrespective of the actual 'control' that citizen purports to maintain over governmental activity.").
Some courts have also held that private individuals who make payments to a public official can be charged under the Hobbs Act, either as an aider and abettor or co-conspirator, if he or she is truly the instigator of the transaction. See United States v. Torcasio, 959 F.2d 503, 505-06 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1276-79 (4th Cir. 1986) (conviction affirmed for aiding and abetting extortion under color of official right even though defendant, who paid kickbacks from corporate coffers, was an officer of the victim corporation ); United States v. Wright, 797 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1986). But see United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 823-24 (2d Cir 1990) (consultant employed to help restaurants obtain approvals from corrupt health inspectors had no stake in the conspiracy and was not promoting the outcome).
Finally, in a federal prosecution of a state legislator, there is no legislative privilege barring the introduction at trial of evidence of the defendant's legislative acts. The Supreme Court has held that in such a prosecution a speech or debate type privilege for state legislators cannot be made applicable through Fed.R.Evid. 501. The Court said such privilege is not required by separation of powers considerations or by principles of comity, the two rationales underlying the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution, art. I, §6, cl. 1. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368-74 (1980).
CAVEAT: The Hobbs Act and Campaign Contributions. The Supreme Court has held that, when an allegedly corrupt payment masquerades as a campaign contribution, and when there is no evidence that the corpus of the "contribution" inured to the personal benefit of the public officer in question or was a product of force or duress, the Hobbs Act requires proof of a quid pro quo agreement between the contributor and the public officer. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991). However, the Court has also held that proof that a quid pro quo agreement existed in a corruption case brought under the Hobbs Act may be proven circumstantially. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992). This interpretation of the dimensions of the hobbs Act in corruption scenarios is consistent with the parameters of the facts needed to prove the federal crimes of bribery and gratuities under 18 U.S.C. § 201. See United States v. Brewster, 50-6 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1972), 9 U.S.A.M. §§ 85.101 through 85.105, supra.

CAVEAT: The Hobbs Act and evidence of a quid pro quo. When the Hobbs Act is applied to public corruption scenarios that lack evidence of actual "extortionate" duress, some courts have interpreted the Hobbs Act very strictly to require proof of a quid pro quo relationship between the private and the public parties to the transaction, even where the corpus of the payment inured to the personal benefit of the public official. See United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d. 543 (11th Cir. 1994)(Hobbs Act did not apply to pattern of in-kind payments given personally to Florida mayor in the absence of evidence of a quid pro quo relationship between the mayor and alleged private corrupter); United States v. Taylor, 993 F.2d 382 (4th Cir. 1993)(same); United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 1086 (9th Cir. 1991)(same); contra United States v. Brandford, 33 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 1994)(Hobbs Act does not require proof of quid pro quo where corpus of corrupt payment inured to the personal benefit of public officer). In addition, some courts require that corruption cases brought under the "color of official right" clause of the Hobbs Act be accompanied by proof that the public official induced the payment. See Montoya, supra.

At the very least, the courts will probably not extend the "color of official right" clause of the Hobbs Act beyond the parameters of crimes of bribery and gratuities in relation to federal officials that are described in 18 U.S.C. § 201. See United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974), 9 U.S.A.M. §§ 85.101 through 85.105, supra. This means that where the corpus of the alleged corrupt payment passed to someone or something other than the public official personally (including those where it passed to a political committee), the Hobbs Act probably does not apply unless there is also evidence of a quid pro quo. And even then, some Circuits, such as the Ninth, require additional proof that the payment was induced by the public official.

PRACTICE TIP: The Public Integrity Section possesses considerable expertise in using the Hobbs Act to prosecute public corruption. While not required, AUSAs are strongly urged to consult with the Public Integrity Section in the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases under this statutory theory. Public Integrity can be reached at 202-514-1412, or by fax at 202-514-3003.

[cited in JM 9-131.010]




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